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Abstract
Prosocial compensation (PC) is a corporate social responsibility (CSR) practice that involves donating money to a charitable 
cause on behalf of customers as a means to compensate them for their loss after a service failure. In order to determine the 
effectiveness of PC, we carried out three experiments while also comparing its effectiveness within private and public settings. 
Experiment 1 focused on the signaling effects of communicating the promise to offer PC to potential customers in the event of 
service failure. Results show that, in both private and public settings, PC has positive effects on corporate image, credibility, 
and word-of-mouth intent. More significantly, PC improved one’s CSR image, whereas more tangible compensation, such as 
a gift voucher, did not. Experiments 2A and 2B focused on the effects of offering PC after a service failure on perceptions of 
justice. Results show that PC contributes to perceived distributive justice, procedural justice, and post-recovery satisfaction 
in both private and public settings. Our study showed that PC could be a relevant new CSR practice for organizations wanting 
to enhance theirs CSR image while contributing to fulfilling their ethical and philanthropic CSR responsibilities. We discuss 
the implications of our findings and offer several avenues for follow-up research on this initial study on PC.
Keywords Corporate philanthropy · Justice theory · Prosocial compensation · Service guarantee · Signaling theory
Introduction
CSR is increasingly becoming a mainstream corporate 
development (Bolton and Mattila 2015) and seen as a deter-
minant of an organization’s success (Kiessling et al. 2016). 
It is important to distinguish the ethical and philanthropic 
dimensions of companies’ CSR responsibilities from the 
economic and legal dimensions (Carroll 1991; Wood 2010). 
As an example of a response to their ethical responsibilities, 
organizations may use fair and just recovery procedures in 
the event of service failures. In terms of their philanthropic 
responsibilities, they use practices such as making dona-
tions to charitable causes and employee volunteering. In this 
study, we introduce prosocial compensation (PC). This is a 
proactive corporate philanthropic practice where the com-
pany donates money following a service failure to a charita-
ble cause on behalf of its customers as a means to compen-
sate them for their losses. In effect, PC is the symbiosis of 
corporate donations and service guarantees. A service guar-
antee is an explicit and formal promise made by an organiza-
tion to achieve certain service quality levels. It is through 
the compensation offered as a part of the service guarantee 
that the connection is made with corporate donations. As 
an example, a leasing company offers business customers 
a service guarantee that includes six service promises. For 
each promise violated, the organization donates 200 euro 
to a cause of the customer’s choosing (Ahaus and De Haan 
2010). We will argue that PC, as psychological compensa-
tion for the customer, could be an attractive alternative for 
the often-used more-tangible types of compensation such 
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as money back, discounts, gift vouchers, or free goods and 
services (e.g., Lii and Lee 2012).
As such, PC could contribute to the corporate ethical 
responsibility of being just and fair to customers by being 
transparent and by offering customers compensation for their 
loss as a result of a service failure. PC contributes to philan-
thropic responsibilities by supporting charitable causes. As 
with other CSR practices (Robinson et al. 2012; Plewa et al. 
2015), PC could improve customers’ evaluations of aspects 
such as CSR image, corporate image, perceived justice, and 
post-recovery satisfaction, plus the behavioral word-of-
mouth (WOM) intent. In Experiment 1 (US citizens sample, 
N = 603), we investigate whether explicitly communicating 
the promise to offer PC after a service failure is effective in 
influencing customers’ evaluations of the organization even 
when no service failure occurs. We show that PC leads to a 
significantly larger improvement in CSR image than more 
tangible compensation such as a gift voucher. Offering PC 
also leads to improved corporate image, credibility, and 
WOM-intent although only to a similar extent as tangible 
compensation. PC thus seems to be an effective practice for 
communicating an organization’s engagement with CSR to 
its customers. These findings contribute to signaling theory 
(Connelly et al. 2011; Spence 1974) by showing that not 
only tangible types but also psychological types of com-
pensation, such as PC, have positive signaling effects (e.g., 
Ostrom and Iacobucci 1998).
In Experiments 2A (student sample, N = 148) and 2B 
(mainly US citizens sample, N = 596), we focused on the 
effectiveness of offering PC after a service failure in fulfill-
ing the organization’s ethical responsibility to be just and 
fair by restoring perceived justice. The idea of PC is that 
it can be used as a service recovery tool to make up for 
a service failure and return the customer to a state of sat-
isfaction (Mattila 2001). Therefore, we studied the effects 
of offering PC (compared to offering no compensation and 
tangible compensation) on customers’ evaluations of per-
ceived justice and post-recovery satisfaction. We found that 
PC leads to more positive levels of distributive justice, pro-
cedural justice, and post-recovery satisfaction than offer-
ing no compensation, and thus contributes to fulfilling the 
organization’s ethical responsibility, although offering tan-
gible compensation does better. These findings contribute 
to justice theory (Adams 1965) in service recovery research 
(Vázques-Casielles et al. 2010) by showing that psychologi-
cal compensation, such as PC, has positive effects on per-
ceived justice and satisfaction.
In our three experiments, we manipulated the choice of 
charity and the type of sector. First, we manipulated choice 
by using two types of PC: one where the organization pre-
determined a single charitable cause and one where the cus-
tomer could freely choose their own cause. Despite existing 
research showing the positive effects of choice on customers’ 
evaluations (Mattila and Cranage 2005; Robinson et al. 
2012), our experiments failed to find this effect. Second, 
in order to broaden the generic context of the effects of PC, 
we studied its effect within both private and public settings. 
Despite the potential public–private differences—differences 
in corporate image, the limited use of compensation and ser-
vice guarantees in public settings (Van de Walle 2016) and 
public organizations being financed by the taxpayers—we 
found almost no differences in the effects of PC in public and 
private settings (cf. Thomassen et al. 2017).
Below, we first present the relevant theory on CSR, cor-
porate philanthropy, and PC. To build our hypotheses, that 
are later tested in Experiment 1, we use theory on signaling 
effects. This is followed by the methodology and the results 
of this first experiment. Then, we use insights from justice 
theory to form hypotheses regarding the justice effects of 
PC, similarly followed by a description of the method and 
results of Experiments 2A and 2B. Finally, this paper ends 
with a general discussion, including six avenues for further 
research and some managerial implications of our findings.
Theory
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a corporate commit-
ment to maximize a company’s long-term beneficial impact 
on societal wellbeing while minimizing any harmful effects 
on society by being responsible for its customers, sharehold-
ers, employees and society in general, even if this requires 
sacrifices from the organization (Bolton and Mattila 2015; 
Carroll and Shabana 2010). Carroll (1991) proposes con-
ceptualizing CSR as consisting of four dimensions that he 
refers to as ‘the pyramid of corporate social responsibility’ 
(Carroll and Shabana 2010; Gautier and Pache 2015; Wood 
2010). The economic responsibility of a company to produce 
goods/services and make profits as the basis for corporate 
continuity is viewed as the most fundamental dimension and 
is the basis for the other dimensions. Next, there are the legal 
responsibilities (to pursue the corporate mission within the 
framework of the law) and then the ethical responsibilities. 
These are activities and practices expected by customers 
even though they are not codified into law (Carroll 1991). 
Customers should, for example, be treated right, just, and 
fair (Larsen and Lawson 2013). The fourth dimension con-
sists of corporate philanthropic responsibilities. These are 
seen as the purely voluntary actions of a ‘good corporate 
citizen’ that go beyond ethical obligations.
Companies are under increasing pressure from share-
holders, customers, employees, and society to enhance their 
social activities (Cantrell et al. 2015; Kiessling et al. 2016; 
Pérez and del Bosque 2015). CSR initiatives are a corporate 
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response to this environment in which regulations, non-gov-
ernmental actors, and institutionalized norms set expecta-
tions about appropriate organizational behavior (Campbell 
2007). As such, CSR has transformed from being a ‘good-
will’ concept into a mainstream development (Bolton and 
Mattila 2015; Kiessling et al. 2016) and a key determinant 
of long-term performance and corporate success (Kiessling 
et al. 2016). First, by engaging in CSR, companies face fewer 
risks, and avoid customer and activist boycotts (Groza et al. 
2011; Pérez and del Bosque 2013a). Second, CSR can have 
a positive impact on public opinion (Pfau et al. 2008) and on 
customers’ affective and behavioral responses (Bolton and 
Mattila 2015). Being socially responsible as an organiza-
tion can enhance relationships with customers (Kang and 
Hustvedt 2014), improve customer satisfaction, and increase 
the company’s market value (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006).
Note that in the current research, we take a strong focus 
on how CSR activity is perceived by customers (cf. Carroll 
1991). More recent developments suggest that CSR should 
not only consider customers to be the “key drivers of com-
panies’ social initiatives” (Wang et al. 2016, p. 535), but also 
study the engagement of employees in CSR activities, and 
the various levels—individual, organizational, institutional-
in which CSR can play a role (Aguinis and Glavas 2012). We 
fully acknowledge these new developments, but as the main 
topic of study is prosocial compensation—a CSR activity 
focusing on customers—we first need to understand the indi-
vidual customer’s perspective, before we can integrate that 
into multilevel research and other stakeholders. Moreover, 
recent insights on CSR in management research (Wang et al. 
2016) suggest that disentangling different elements of CSR 
improves the understanding of CSR activities. In line with 
this view, rather than studying CSR on an aggregate level, 
we focus on two specific elements of CSR, that is taking care 
of customers and doing good to society. Both are discussed 
below in more detail.
Corporate Ethical Responsibilities
Carroll’s third dimension, ‘ethical responsibilities’ con-
sists of “standards, norms or expectations about fairness 
and justice and embrace those activities and practices that 
are expected by customers even though they are not codi-
fied into law” (Carroll 1991, p. 41). In the context of our 
research, and based on Carroll (1991) and Carroll and Sha-
bana (2010), ethical corporate responsibilities can be defined 
as those standards, norms, and expectations that reflect a 
concern for what customers regard as fair, just, honest, or in 
keeping with or protecting their moral rights. Pérez and del 
Bosque (2013a) give examples of corporate ethical activi-
ties such as investing in ethical behavior (ethics officers, 
ethics committees, codes of ethics, training programs, and 
incentive programs), corporate disclosures (reports, press 
releases, and websites) and trust marks (certifications and 
memberships).
Although these ethical responsibilities are not coded 
into law, companies have moral obligations translated 
into consumer rights and principles (Larsen and Lawson 
2013). Examples are the Rights to Safety, to be Informed, 
to Choose, to be Heard, to be Satisfied with the fulfillment 
of Basic Needs, to be Redressed, to receive Consumer 
Education, and to contribute to a Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment (Consumers International 2009). The Right 
to Redress is “to receive a fair settlement of just claims, 
including compensation for misrepresentation, shoddy 
goods or unsatisfactory services” (Consumers International 
2009, p. 516). Underpinning this is the Right of Fairness 
in Exchange in terms of value and equity derived from a 
transaction (Larsen and Lawson 2013). At the base of this 
is the Right to receive Appropriate Service, which relates 
to an holistic expectation that pervades the whole shopping 
experience (Larsen and Lawson 2013) from a service-dom-
inant logic approach where customers are placed at the heart 
of service design and operations (Lusch and Vargo 2014). 
Finally, there is the ‘Right to Quality’ (Larsen 1998) that is 
also endorsed in the 1999 revisions of the United Nations’ 
Consumer Policy Framework (United Nations 2003). This 
right is concerned with “the product or service fulfilling its 
purpose in an acceptable way and providing sufficient value 
in both exchange and use” (Larsen and Lawson 2013, p. 
521). To acknowledge these consumer rights and to inform 
customers about their rights, companies may use contracts, 
codes of conduct, warranties, codes of ethics, and service 
guarantees. By doing so, they create transparency such that 
customers know what they can expect, which can be seen as 
ethical behavior (the third dimension of Carroll’s pyramid).
Corporate Philanthropic Responsibilities
Carroll’s (1991) fourth dimension, ‘philanthropic responsi-
bilities,’ consists of voluntary actions that support being a 
good corporate citizen within the environmental and social 
fields. Examples of environmental actions are active partici-
pation in environmental conservation, recycling programs, 
use of green materials, developing non-animal testing proce-
dures, and fighting deforestation and global warming. Within 
the social field, actions can be related to supporting chari-
table causes, sponsoring cultural activities, taking diversity 
initiatives, supporting community events, providing on-site 
childcare for employees, and supporting local businesses.
Some scholars (e.g., Gautier and Pache 2015) use a nar-
rower definition of corporate philanthropy. In this narrower 
context, it is defined as “the voluntary business giving of 
money, time or in-kind goods, without any direct commer-
cial benefit, to one or more organizations whose core pur-
pose is to benefit the community’s welfare” (Madden et al. 
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2006, p. 49). It is a form of cross-sector partnership between 
a company and a non-profit organization (Liket and Simaens 
2015). Unlike individual philanthropy (e.g., Andreoni 2006), 
where many acts of generosity are informal and spontane-
ous, corporate philanthropy is an organized phenomenon. It 
takes place within complex and rationalized organizations, 
with formalized action plans (Gautier and Pache 2015).
As with CSR in general, there is a sense of there being a 
social expectation that companies will practice philanthropy. 
Gautier and Pache (2015) offered three different motives for 
engaging in corporate philanthropy. One motive for com-
panies is a commitment to the common good (altruism) 
without any reciprocity expected for their giving. A second 
motive is a community investment: companies see it as a 
long-term investment from which they will ultimately ben-
efit. Finally, corporate philanthropy is also used as a market-
ing practice to increase sales with a direct commercial profit 
(Varadarajan and Menon 1988). One observes that the third 
motive falls outside the narrow definition of Madden et al. 
(2006, see paragraph above). Nevertheless, corporate philan-
thropy has evolved from an altruistic practice to a strategic 
management practice and an investment that provides com-
panies with a competitive advantage (Cantrell et al. 2015). 
As a non-price differentiating factor (Gautier and Pache 
2015), corporate philanthropy induces actual and potential 
customers to have a more favorable corporate image (Brown 
and Dacin 1997), offers a better and differential competitive 
advantage (Cantrell et al. 2015), improves relations with cus-
tomers who are more satisfied (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006) 
and loyal to the products and services (Luo 2005), ultimately 
leading to increased sales and a better financial performance 
(Lev et al. 2010).
Although PC has not yet been studied, a corporate philan-
thropy marketing activity that shares many similarities with 
PC that has been extensively studied is cause-related market-
ing. This is the practice of donating an amount to a charita-
ble cause every time a customer buys a specific product or 
service (Howie et al. 2015; Varadarajan and Menon 1988). 
In essence it is “the process of formulating and implement-
ing marketing activities that are characterized by an offer 
from the company to contribute a specified amount to a des-
ignated cause when customers engage in revenue-providing 
exchanges that satisfy organizational and individual objec-
tives” (Varadarajan and Menon 1988, p. 60). Cause-related 
marketing allows companies to simultaneously pursue both 
financial and prosocial objectives. Companies create mutual 
value and equity for customers through the act of giving 
(Kiessling et al. 2016). Cause-related marketing campaigns 
lead to a more positive corporate image (Kang and Hustvedt 
2014; Varadarajan and Menon 1988), a more positive CSR 
image (Chernev and Blair 2015), more positive switching 
behavior (Smith and Alcorn 1991), and increased purchase 
intentions (Brown and Dacin 1997; Howie et  al. 2015; 
Strahilevitz and Meyers 1998). Given their similarities, we 
would expect PC to also have such positive effects.
Prosocial Compensation
In general, tangible types of compensation such as money 
back, gift vouchers, and free products/services are used as a 
recovery instrument to offset customers’ experienced losses 
as a consequence of a service failure (e.g., Lii and Lee 2012). 
However, intangible and more psychological types of com-
pensation are also used. For example, the parking depart-
ment of a large municipality offered its customers a service 
guarantee with five specific service promises including wait-
ing no longer than 15 min at the reception desk and a reac-
tion to any letters within 2 weeks. If the department failed to 
meet one of these promises, the customer could select either 
a tangible gift or have 12.50 euro donated to a charitable 
cause (The Hague 2005). As such, this municipality used 
both tangible compensation (the gift) and PC. This PC could 
be seen as contributing to the third and fourth dimensions of 
Carroll’s (1991) ‘pyramid of corporate social responsibility.’ 
It contributes to corporate philanthropic responsibilities (the 
fourth dimension) by offering donations to good causes, and 
contributes to corporate ethical responsibilities (the third 
dimension) by offering customers compensation after a ser-
vice failure and increasing fairness and justice even though 
offering compensation is not codified into law. Further, PC 
contributes to four ethical consumer rights (Larsen and Law-
son 2013). First, because PC is explicitly communicated in 
the form of a promise, it contributes to customers’ Right 
to be Informed. Customers know what they can expect and 
what the consequences for the organization are when the 
promise is violated. Second, by offering compensation in 
the form of PC after a service failure, it contributes to the 
customers’ Right to be Redressed. Third and fourth, the 
promised quality levels in the service guarantee address the 
Right to Quality and the Right to Appropriate Service. In 
this way, PC is able to contribute to delivering a superior 
customer value.
With a similar consequence to cause-related marketing, in 
which a donation follows the purchase of a certain product 
or service, with PC the donation to a cause follows a service 
failure. The win–win aspect of PC is that it aims to satisfy 
customers’ demands while, at the same time, allowing the 
company to meet its philanthropic responsibilities. The com-
pany contributes to being a good corporate citizen and to its 
philanthropic responsibilities by contributing resources to 
charitable causes.
An interesting aspect of PC is that it combines the prac-
tices of corporate philanthropy and service guarantees, a 
concept intensively studied in the marketing and services 
management literature (for an overview: see Hogreve and 
Gremler 2009). A service guarantee is defined as “an explicit 
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promise made by a service provider to: (a) deliver a certain 
level of service to satisfy the customer, and (b) compen-
sate the customer if the service is not sufficiently deliv-
ered” (Hogreve and Gremler 2009, p. 324). These service 
guarantees generally consist of one or more promises (the 
scope), the compensation in the event of a service failure, 
and the payout process. In the context of a service guaran-
tee, a ‘service failure’ is a violation of the service guarantee 
where the service level offered fails to meet one or more 
promises in the service guarantee. Here, a customer could 
experience economic (e.g., money, time) and/or social (e.g., 
status, esteem) losses (Kim and Ulgado 2012) that, regard-
less of who was responsible (Magnini et al. 2007), could 
lead to negative feelings and responses (Siu et al. 2013). It 
is through this compensation that the link between corporate 
philanthropy and service guarantees is made.
Researching Signaling and Justice Effects 
of Prosocial Compensation
This study has two empirical components. First, we are 
interested in the effects of explicitly communicating the 
promise to offer PC. In our first experiment, we conducted 
research among potential customers visiting the website of 
an organization. We investigated the effects on CSR image 
of two types of PC (one with a fixed cause predetermined 
by the organization and another where the customer could 
chose the cause), of not offering compensation and offering 
tangible compensation. We also investigated the effects on 
corporate image, perceived credibility, and WOM-intent. 
Besides investigating the effect of choice, we also simu-
lated public and private settings to see if this played a role. 
In daily life, citizens, as customers, are dependent on very 
different public services such as garbage collection and 
the issuing of formal documents such as driving licenses, 
passports, and visas. Many of these services are offered in 
a monopolistic situation where customers do not have the 
possibility to choose. As such, the aim of using PC in public 
settings would not be to gain market share and improve the 
competitive position, but to improve one’s image and rela-
tionship with customers. Despite the importance of public 
services in the service arena, CSR research seems to largely 
ignore this sector. In fact, the effects of public CSR practices 
on customers’ evaluations have received little attention in the 
public management literature. Second, we are interested in 
whether PC contributes to the organization being perceived 
as ethical, just, and fair in a service recovery setting after a 
service failure. In other words, we study whether custom-
ers perceive the “doing good” as sufficient compensation 
for their negative service experience. When customers do 
not perceive being responsible to the society as important 
(so-called Consumer Social Responsibility; Vitell 2015), PC 
will never function as CSR engagement. In Experiments 2A 
and 2B, we researched the effects of receiving PC (with and 
without choice of charitable cause), no compensation, and 
tangible compensation on distributive justice, procedural 
justice, and post-recovery satisfaction.
In all our empirical studies, we used experimental 
vignette designs. Vignette studies are commonly used in 
CSR research (e.g., Alexander 2002; Bolton and Mattila 
2015; Folse et al. 2010; Howie et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 
2015). This technique is appropriate and therefore often 
used to investigate emotional situations (e.g., Barkworth and 
Murphy 2015; Schoefer and Ennew 2005; Van Doorn et al. 
2012). Vignette studies have been used in similar service 
failure situations as in our research (Ohtsubo and Watanabe 
2009; Thomassen et al. 2017) and are seen as having sev-
eral advantages. Vignette studies supply standard and homo-
geneous stimuli to all respondents. This enhances internal 
validity and measurement reliability, eases replication, and 
improves construct validity by focusing respondents’ atten-
tion upon specific features of the hypotheses (Wason et al. 
2002). They also enable the investigation of scenarios that 
occur infrequently (Schoefer and Ennew 2005), as well as 
saving time by summarizing events that might, otherwise, 
unfold over a long period. Furthermore, instead adopting 
a random sampling approach would result in only a small 
number of respondents with relevant, but often different, 
experiences.
Study 1: Signaling Effects of Promising 
Prosocial Compensation
Signaling theory (Spence 1974) has been applied in many 
fields including finance, strategic management, corporate 
governance, human resource management, and market-
ing (Connelly et al. 2011) and has received infrequent, but 
growing, attention in the CSR and business ethics literature 
(Zerbini 2017). Signaling theory is concerned with situa-
tions in which customers have limited information about 
intangible aspects such as corporate CSR engagement 
(Zerbini 2017) and service quality (Erevelles et al. 2001; 
Roggeveen et al. 2014) than the organization has itself. This 
can lead to existing and potential customers having an incor-
rect perception of the organization. Signaling theory states 
that customers’ perceptions can be affected by both intrin-
sic and extrinsic cues. Customers use extrinsic cues, such 
as advertisements about CSR practices, to identify ethical 
businesses, and distinguish them from the unethical ones 
(Zerbini 2017). In this way, investing in charitable causes 
and communicating this fact can signal that a company is 
sociably responsible. Other extrinsic cues such as third-party 
ratings, warranties (Zerbini 2017), codes of ethics (Colwell 
et al. 2011), and service guarantees (Ostrom and Iacobucci 
1998) are similarly used to influence customers’ perceptions. 
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In this study, we investigate whether explicitly communicat-
ing the promise to offer PC has a positive signaling effect 
on CSR image. We also investigate the effects of PC on 
corporate image, perceived organizational credibility, and 
the behavioral WOM-intent.
Prosocial compensation can come in various guises, 
with either the supplier or the recipient of the unsatisfac-
tory goods or services determining the charitable cause to 
which the compensation will be given. When customers have 
the possibility to choose the beneficiary, they may not only 
perceive the company as more ethically credible, they may 
also be more likely to perceive it as more socially responsi-
ble (Howie et al. 2015).
CSR Image
CSR image can, in general, be defined as the customers’ 
perceptions of corporate responses to general social con-
cerns held by all stakeholder groups (based on Pérez and 
del Bosque 2013a). It is important to distinguish between 
CSR image and the more general corporate image because 
research shows that a good CSR image contributes to cor-
porate success since it can function as an important differ-
entiating factor (e.g., Cantrell et al. 2015; Carroll and Sha-
bana 2010; Gautier and Pache 2015; Kiessling et al. 2016) 
by increasing credibility, likeability, trustworthiness, and 
positive attitudes towards the company (Aaker 1996; Howie 
et al. 2015; Pérez and del Bosque 2013b). This could lead to 
an increase in satisfaction (Bolton and Mattila 2015; Pérez 
et al. 2013; Pérez and del Bosque 2015), which is important 
for both companies and public organizations.
Research on the effects of specific CSR practices shows 
the positive effects of cause-related marketing (Chernev and 
Blair 2015; Howie et al. 2015) and corporate volunteering 
(Plewa et al. 2015) on CSR image. Although the effects of 
PC on CSR image have not been investigated, we would 
expect, in line with the findings on cause-related market-
ing and corporate volunteering, that promising to offer PC 
after a service failure will have a more positive impact on 
CSR image than promising no or tangible compensation. In 
line with research on cause-related marketing (Howie et al. 
2015), we also hypothesize that offering a choice positively 
affects CSR image. This leads to our first set of hypotheses:
H1a Promising to offer PC after a service failure leads 
to a more positive CSR image than not promising any 
compensation.
H1b Promising to offer PC after a service failure leads 
to a more positive CSR image than promising tangible 
compensation.
H1c Promising to offer PC with the cause determined by the 
customer leads to a more positive CSR image than when the 
cause is predetermined by the service provider.
Corporate Image
Corporate image is a customer’s global evaluation of their 
attitudes and perceptions towards a company (Groza et al. 
2011; Pfau et al. 2008). Possible dimensions include nega-
tive or positive, favorable or unfavorable, and bad or good 
(Aggarwal 2004; Groza et al. 2011). CSR practices build 
relational corporate assets such as an appealing and more 
positive corporate image (Hur et al. 2014; Kiessling et al. 
2016; Pfau et al. 2008; Wood 2010) that enables compa-
nies to increase customer loyalty in the form of repurchase 
and recommendation behavior (Pérez and del Bosque 2015; 
Zerbini 2017). Here, the literature does not offer any clues 
as to whether CSR-related compensation would lead to bet-
ter evaluations than more tangible compensation. However, 
research on corporate philanthropy practices shows that 
cause-related marketing campaigns (Kang and Hustvedt 
2014; Varadarajan and Menon 1988), employee volunteer-
ing (Plewa et al. 2015), and donations (Cantrell et al. 2015) 
do have positive effects on corporate image. In addition, 
research into the effect of offering service guarantees has 
shown that this practice also has positive effects on corporate 
image (Roggeveen et al. 2014). However, the effects of PC 
on corporate image have not yet been researched.
Credibility
Corporate credibility is the customers’ perceptions of the 
company’s trustworthiness. From a CSR perspective, trust 
is the customers’ expectations and perceptions of socially 
responsible or ethically justifiable corporate behavior (Hur 
et al. 2014). In the context of our research, credibility is the 
customers’ belief and confidence that a company will act 
in the best interests of its customers and keep its promises 
(Hur et al. 2014; Kang and Hustvedt 2014). Positive cor-
porate social behavior enhances customers’ perceptions of 
an organization’s credibility and trustworthiness (Hur et al. 
2014; Pérez and del Bosque 2013b; Pfau et al. 2008). Prac-
tices such as sponsorship and cause-related marketing cam-
paigns enhance corporate credibility (Kim and Choi 2007; 
Pérez and del Bosque 2013b). Communicating the offering 
of a service guarantee has similar positive effects on per-
ceived credibility (Erevelles et al. 2001; McDougall et al. 
1998; Ostrom and Iacobucci 1998). A high level of corpo-
rate credibility leads to customers forming a positive attitude 
towards a company and increases their loyalty towards the 
company (Kang and Hustvedt 2014; Pérez and del Bosque 
2013b).
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WOM‑Intent
WOM-intent, also referred to as willingness to recommend, 
is, in general terms, the behavioral intention to informally 
communicate one’s evaluations of goods and services 
(Anderson 1998). WOM-intent can be negative in the 
forms of warning friends or others, taking legal action, or 
complaining to consumer agencies (Ingram et al. 2005). In 
this study, we focus on positive WOM-intent. Specifically 
where this study involves public services, WOM-intent is 
defined as the customers’ intention to talk positively about 
an organization and defend it in situations where there is 
negative WOM. Research shows that both CSR practices 
(Kang and Hustvedt 2014) and communicating a service 
guarantee (Hocutt and Bowers 2005) have positive effects 
on WOM-intent.
Although the effects of promising to offer PC after a ser-
vice failure on corporate image, credibility, and WOM-intent 
have not been previously studied, we would expect, based 
on the literature discussed above, that promising to offer PC 
will have a more positive effect on these variables than not 
promising any compensation (H2a). Given that both tangible 
and prosocial forms of compensation are perceived as costly 
for an organization, we hypothesize that PC will have similar 
effects as tangible compensation (H2b) on these variables. 
Finally, in line with research on cause-related marketing 
(e.g., Grau and Folse 2007; Howie et al. 2015; Robinson 
et al. 2012), we expect that offering PC with a choice of 
beneficiary will lead to a more positive corporate image, 
credibility and WOM-intent than when the beneficiary is 
predetermined (H2c).
H2a Promising to offer PC after a service failure leads 
to a more positive corporate image, higher credibility, 
and greater WOM-intent than when compensation is not 
promised.
H2b Promising to offer PC after a service failure has a simi-
lar effect on corporate image, credibility, and WOM-intent 
as offering tangible compensation.
H2c Promising to offer PC to a beneficiary of the customer’s 
choosing leads to a more positive corporate image, higher 
credibility and WOM-intent than PC with a predetermined 
beneficiary.
Sector
We tested our hypotheses within both the public and pri-
vate sectors to broaden the generalizability of our findings. 
Depending on the sector and industry, CSR practices can 
have different signaling effects on potential customers’ 
evaluations (Pérez and del Bosque 2015; Strahilevitz and 
Myers 1998). This could also be the case with PC. Further-
more, a service guarantee, the corresponding compensa-
tion, and in our case PC, should align with the image of 
the organization if it is to be effective (Marmorstein et al. 
2001; Roggeveen et al. 2014). For example, the image peo-
ple have of non-profit organizations is of being warmer but 
less professional than that of for-profit organizations (Aaker 
et al. 2010). Given that public organizations do not have a 
profit-driven focus, customers might also perceive public 
organizations as less professional than for-profit companies. 
Another factor is that public organizations are funded by 
collective means such as income tax revenues. Research 
on service guarantee compensation among passengers of 
Stockholm’s public transport network (Björlin Lidén and 
Edvardsson 2003) showed that the public context leads to 
other additional compensation requirements such as being 
fair to customers and the careful use of taxpayers’ money. In 
this sense, customers could regard it as less appropriate for 
public organizations to be spending money on compensating 
for service failures (Van de Walle 2016). However, in direct 
exchange situations, where customers pay for a public ser-
vice, their money is directly related to the value they receive 
(Alford 2002). In such situations, there may well be many 
similarities in customers’ evaluations of public and private 
services. Finally, offering compensation for poor service is 
relatively uncommon in public services compared with pri-
vate services (Van de Walle 2016); people generally do not 




Experiment 1 was designed to test the signaling effects of 
PC on customers. A total of 603 US citizens (44.3% female; 
Mage = 36.7; SD = 10.96) participated through a digital web-
based questionnaire (Qualtrics) using the online MTurk 
platform. They were randomly assigned to one of our four 
compensation conditions explained in the form of a service 
guarantee, and to one of two sectoral scenarios in a between-
subjects factorial design. The four guarantee options were 
no compensation, gift voucher, PC to a predetermined fixed 
cause, or PC to a cause of the customer’s choosing each 
with two sectoral options (internet store, governmental visa 
organization).
Procedure and Dependent Variables
An internet store was used to represent a private organi-
zation, and a governmental visa organization as a pub-
lic organization. Products were selected that would be 
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relevant to the real-life experiences of the participants. 
Participants in the private sector scenario learned that 
they were looking at the website of the only internet store 
selling a specific product they wanted to buy. The public 
scenario participants learned they were planning to go to 
a foreign country and, therefore, needed to order a travel 
visa from the online website of the relevant governmental 
organization. Participants were each presented with one 
of these scenarios (private or public) and with one of the 
four service guarantees. Participants were asked to imag-
ine themselves in the role of the potential customer in the 
encounter and to think about how they would evaluate the 
given situation. In the scenario where no compensation 
was offered, the organization promised: ‘Friendly and 
efficient service. Whatever we do, we keep our promises, 
guaranteed! If not, we’ll apologize and fix the problem.’ 
In the three compensation scenarios, depending on the 
type of compensation, an additional line stated: ‘You’ll 
also receive a personal gift voucher worth 5 dollar/we will 
donate 5 dollar to a fixed cause/we will donate 5 dollar to 
a cause of your own choice.’
After reading their scenario, participants were asked to 
give their opinion on four dependent variables (see Appen-
dix in Table 4 for all the items). In order for the items to 
fit with the scenarios, we used a four-item scale for CSR 
image (α = 0.94) combining two items used by Grohmann 
and Bodur (2015) and by Wagner et al. (2009) with two 
items used by Brown and Dacin (1997), Folse et al. (2010) 
and Howie et al. (2015). For example, we asked participants 
whether they thought the organization had a legitimate inter-
est in improving society. To measure corporate image, we 
used a four-item scale (α = 0.97) with, for example, the 
participant asked to rank the organization on a seven-point 
scale from unfavorable to favorable (cf. Aggarwal 2004; 
Groza et al. 2011). For credibility, in order to fit the sce-
nario, an adapted four-item scale (α = 0.81) was based on 
scales used by McDougall et al. (1998) and Ostrom and 
Iacobucci (1998). For example, we asked if the respondent 
would feel confident in dealing with the organization. Many 
scales measuring WOM-intent, including the intention to 
refer an organization, have been developed for private set-
tings. To also measure WOM-intent in a public setting we 
developed a new scale including two items on whether par-
ticipants would say positive things about the organization 
and whether they would argue against people saying nega-
tive things about that organization (α = 0.77). Finally, and 
mainly for exploratory reasons, we also measured the effects 
on warmth, competence, and skepticism to investigate pos-
sible moderating effects of the sector. However, since no sig-
nificant differences in the signaling effects of PC were found 
between the two sectors (see Results section below), we have 
not provided further information on these three dependent 
variables. Following questions concerning gender, age, and 
nationality, we asked participants to judge the realism of 
the scenario using a single item (cf. Magnini et al. 2007). In 
addition, at the end of the questionnaire, we presented three 
manipulation checks to ensure that participants had grasped 
their specific scenario in terms of the sector, the communi-
cation of a service guarantee, and the compensation prom-
ised. Finally, we used an adapted version of the instructional 
manipulation check question (cf. Oppenheimer et al. 2009) 
to assess whether participants were properly reading and 
understanding the questions.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks and Control Variables
The criteria we applied led to the exclusion of 22 of the 625 
participants who failed the instructional manipulation check 
and/or two or three of the manipulation checks. We further 
compared the results with and without those participants 
who failed one of the manipulation checks and, as the results 
showed similar patterns, we included those participants with 
only one failed check.
We ran a 4 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived realism of 
each scenario to check whether the scenarios were equally 
realistic. This indicated a significant Compensation 
effect: F(3,595) = 19.88, p = .000 (MNC = 5.44, SD = 1.38; 
MGV = 4.77, SD = 1.74; MFC = 4.27, SD = 1.70; MCCC  = 4.11, 
SD = 1.88). The analysis also showed a significant Sector 
effect: F(1,595) = 31.60, p = 0.000 (Minternet store = 5.03, 
SD = 1.56; Mvisa = 4.26, SD = 1.85). We considered this fur-
ther in order to rule out differences in perceived realism 
as an alternative driver for the effects found in the general 
ANOVAs (see later results). In this check, we were unable 
to run an ANCOVA with realism as a covariate (since the 
covariate was not independent of the treatment conditions: 
cf. Field 2013; Gerber and Green 2012), nor could we use 
PROCESS analyses (Hayes 2009) given our multi-categori-
cal predictor. Therefore, we used regression analyses includ-
ing realism and the four dummy variables indicating Sector 
and Compensation conditions (with No compensation being 
the reference group) and excluding a constant in the equation 
to rule out realism as an alternative driver of Compensation 
effects on the dependent variables. Results showed that real-
ism was partially mediating the effects (realism predicted 
our four DVs, p < 0.001). However, and more importantly, 
the effects of Compensation and Sector remained significant 
(p’s < 0.05) when controlling for this partial mediator and 
showed the same pattern of effects as with the ANOVAs. 
As such, although realism was found to explain parts of the 
effects, it was not their only driver and, thus, cannot con-
stitute an alternative explanation for our findings. Having 
resolved this issue, we can now continue to report the results 
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of the ANOVAs that include both the main and interaction 
effects.
Main Dependent Variables
A MANOVA with the four dependent variables yielded 
a significant main effect of Compensation, Λ = 0.89, 
F(12, 1566.58) = 6.19, p = 0.000. These variables are 
correlated significantly (r’s vary between 0.62 and 0.76, 
p’s < 0.001), but as r’s < 0.90 we can include all four in 
the MANOVA (cf. Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Separate 
univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed 
significant Compensation effects on corporate image 
(F(3,595) = 4.80, p = 0.003), credibility (F(3,595) = 6.28, 
p = 0.000), WOM-intent (F(3,595) = 7.06, p = 0.000) and 
CSR-image (F(3,595) = 15.13, p = 0.000)—see Appendix 
in Table 5. In order to test the hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2, we 
used specific post hoc Bonferroni analyses using pairwise 
comparisons of the dependent variables. The results are 
presented in Table 1. See Appendix in Table 6 for Ms and 
SDs of all cell means.
In terms of CSR image, the results show that PC with 
either a fixed cause (M = 5.37, SD = 1.11) or a cause of the 
customer’s choosing (M = 5.40, SD = 1.20) led to a signifi-
cantly more positive CSR image than when no compensa-
tion was offered (M = 4.62, SD = 1.14) (FC–NC: p = 0.000; 
CCC–NC: p = 0.000). Results also showed that both types 
of PC led to a significantly more positive CSR image than 
a gift voucher (M = 4.95, SD = 1.13); (FC–GV: p = 0.007; 
CCC–GV: p = 0.003). In terms of corporate image, PC of the 
customer’s choosing (M = 5.86, SD = 1.14) led to a signifi-
cantly more positive corporate image than no compensation 
(M = 5.41, SD = 1.06); (CCC–NC: p = 0.002). However, PC 
with a fixed cause (M = 5.73, SD = 1.09) resulted in a similar 
corporate image to no compensation (FC–NC: p = 0.066). 
Both types of PC led to a similar corporate image as the 
promise of a gift voucher (M = 5.76, SD = 0.90); (FC–GV: 
p = 1.000; CCC–GV: p = 1.000). When it came to credibil-
ity, both types of PC (MFC = 4.99, SDFC = 1.11; MCCC  = 4.96, 
SDCCC  = 1.18) led to significantly more positive credibility 
than no compensation (M = 4.52, SD = 0.95); (FC–NC: 
p = 0.001; CCC–NC: p = 0.003) and to similar credibility 
perceptions as when a gift voucher was on offer (M = 4.93, 
SD = 0.99); (FC–GV: p = 1.000; CCC–GV: p = 1.000). 
Finally, concerning WOM-intent, the results showed that 
both types of PC (MFC = 4.67, SDFC = 1.35; MCCC  = 4.71, 
SDCCC  = 1.41) led to a significantly more positive WOM-
intent than no compensation (MNC = 4.09, SDNC = 1.26); 
(FC–NC: p = 0.001; CCC–NC: p = 0.000), and to a simi-
lar WOM-intent as a gift voucher (M = 4.67, SD = 1.24); 
(FC–GV: p = 1.000; CCC–GV: p = 1.000).
The analyses reported above combine both the private 
and public scenario data since the findings were broadly 
similar in individual analyses of the private and public set-
tings. In more detail, although the MANOVA also yielded 
a significant effect of Sector, Λ = 0.98, F(4, 592) = 3.18, 
p = 0.013, subsequent separate univariate ANOVAs revealed 
non-significant effects of sector with only one exception: 
there was a significant main Sector effect on CSR image, 
F(1,595) = 6.21, p = 0.013; Minternet store = 4.97, SD = 1.17; 
Mvisa = 5.20, SD = 1.20 (Appendices in Tables 5 and 6 con-
tain all the results of all three experiments). More impor-
tantly, there were no interaction effects between Sector and 
Compensation (F’s < 1.86, p’s > 0.136; see Table 1; Appen-
dix in Table 5), indicating that there were no significant dif-
ferences between the two sectors in the signaling effects of 
PC.
To summarize, H1a and H1b were confirmed in that PC 
leads to a more positive CSR image than no compensation 
or tangible compensation. We also hypothesized that PC 
leads to a more positive corporate image, credibility, and 
WOM-intent than not promising any compensation (H2a). 
Our results support this hypothesis with one exception: fixed 
cause PC did not have a more positive effect on corporate 
image than no compensation. In H2b, we hypothesized that 
PC would lead to a similar corporate image, credibility, and 
WOM-intent as tangible compensation, and our results con-
firmed this. In H1c and H2c, we hypothesized that PC with 
a choice of beneficiary would lead to more favorable evalu-
ations than a fixed cause. Results failed to confirm this argu-
ment since there were no significant differences. Further, we 
found the effects to be similar in private and public settings.
Table 1  Means (SDs in 
parentheses) of the dependent 
variables depending on 
compensation type (Experiment 
1)
Means with the same superscript (a or b) within a row are not significantly different from each other (Bon-
ferroni, p < 0.05)
No compensation (NC) Gift voucher (GV) Fixed cause (FC) Customer’s 
chosen cause 
(CCC)
N 144 155 153 151
CSR image 4.62a (1.14) 4.95a (1.13) 5.37b (1.11) 5.40b (1.20)
Corporate image 5.41a (1.06) 5.76b (0.90) 5.73ab (1.09) 5.86b (1.14)
Credibility 4.52a (0.95) 4.93b (0.99) 4.99b (1.11) 4.96b (1.18)
WOM-intent 4.09a (1.26) 4.67b (1.24) 4.67b (1.35) 4.71b (1.41)
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Study 2: Justice Effects of Offering Prosocial 
Compensation
CSR research on customer attitudes and behaviors has 
mainly focused on its impact on choice and preferences, and 
has largely ignored the context of the service provision (Bol-
ton and Mattila 2015, p. 140). This includes those situations 
where something has gone wrong because of a service fail-
ure. In these cases, service recovery, the response a company 
makes to a service failure (Alexander 2002), has to support 
the corporate obligation to be just and fair to customers by 
recompensing the perceived loss (Mattila 2001). The aim of 
service recovery and offering compensation after a service 
failure is thus to restore perceived justice and restore the 
customer to a state of satisfaction (Mattila 2001).
Justice theory, also known as ‘equity theory,’ has not been 
widely used in the CSR literature (for some exceptions see 
e.g., Alexander 2002; Siu et al. 2013). However, justice 
theory is the dominant theory in the marketing and service 
management literature when addressing service recovery. 
Justice theory states that customers feel they have been fairly 
and ethically treated in a recovery situation when they per-
ceive the recovery as balancing their loss. In any service 
failure encounter, companies need to develop ethical recov-
ery strategies that avoid customers perceiving inequity. Cus-
tomers consider three kinds of fairness in their evaluations 
(Homburg and Fürst 2005; Vázques-Casielles et al. 2010): 
distributive justice (the perceived fairness of the outcome), 
procedural justice (the perceived fairness of the corporate 
recovery policies and procedures), and interactional justice 
(the perceived fairness of treatment by employees).
PC is an intangible and psychological form of benefit that 
customers receive following a service failure. We argue that 
although PC does not provide tangible compensation in the 
form of a material benefit, such as a discount or a refund to 
the customer, customers receive value and equity from the 
act of giving. Consequently, PC could transform an inequi-
table exchange to an equitable one in a service recovery situ-
ation. This might in fact be considered a form of Consumer 
Social Responsibility (Vitell 2015; Pigors and Rockenbach 
2016), as PC could appeal to customers’ responsibility to 
act in the benefit of society. Indeed we know that people 
who donate to a cause may view themselves as good people, 
enhancing their self-esteem and happiness (e.g., Howie et al. 
2015). Research addressing prosocial spending on chari-
table causes has illustrated that people who spend money 
on others, give gifts, or make charitable donations report 
greater happiness (Aknin et al. 2013; Dunn et al. 2008). 
The act of giving contributes to one’s sense of being altru-
istic, empathic, socially responsible, agreeable, and influ-
ential (for an overview, see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). 
Moreover, research on cause-related marketing shows that 
these campaigns can lead customers, apart from acquiring 
a product, to sense pleasure from donating to a good cause 
(Robinson et al. 2012; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). In our 
study, we have researched the effects of PC on distributive 
justice, procedural justice, and post-recovery satisfaction 
while holding interactional justice constant (cf. Chrisafulli 
and Sing 2016).
Finally, research in other situations has shown that cus-
tomers experience greater value and equity when they have 
the freedom to choose a cause (Mattila and Cranage 2005). 
For example, cause-related marketing campaigns in which 
customers can choose the charitable cause generally lead 
to more positive customer evaluations than campaigns with 
fixed causes (Howie et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 2012). 
These findings might be explained by ‘cause importance’ 
and ‘personal involvement.’ First, ‘cause importance’ is 
the degree to which customers find the cause personally 
relevant, with customers identifying with certain causes 
and considering some causes more relevant than others 
(Grau and Folse 2007; Howie et al. 2015). As such, the 
more important a cause is to the customer, the more likely 
they may be to sense outcome and distributive justice. 
Second, ‘personal involvement’ is the process of actively 
choosing and being involved in the donation procedure 
(Robinson et al. 2012). This act of opting for a specific 
cause and being part of the donation process could have 
positive effects on procedural justice.
Distributive Justice
Justice theory argues that a customer will perceive ineq-
uity when comparing their own outcome to investment 
ratio with that of another and finding a difference (Alex-
ander 2002; Siu et al. 2013). Distributive justice is the 
perceived fairness of the outcome (Adams 1965; Homburg 
and Fürst 2005). Research shows that tangible forms of 
compensation have positive effects on perceived distribu-
tive justice (e.g., Wirtz and Mattila 2004; Schoefer and 
Ennew 2005). In a similar vein, we argue that offering 
PC will lead to more positive customer evaluations than 
where compensation is not provided (H3a). The question 
then arises as to whether PC can be as effective as tangible 
compensation in restoring distributive justice. We know 
that the strongest recovery effect occurs when the type of 
compensation represents a resource similar to the failure 
it is supposed to offset (Roschk and Gelbrich 2014). As 
an example, consider a customer who is informed that an 
ordered product is ready for collection and then spends 
20 min going to the pick-up point only for the product 
to not be there. This failure to deliver could be seen as a 
monetary loss since the customer has spent time, energy, 
and money going to the pick-up point. Given the type of 
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loss, we therefore hypothesize that prosocial compensation 
will lead to a less positive evaluation than would tangible 
compensation (H3b). Based on findings in cause-related 
marketing settings (Howie et al. 2015; Robinson et al. 
2012), we further hypothesize that when customers can 
choose the cause themselves, and the ‘cause importance’ 
increases, their perception of the distributive justice will 
be more positive than when the cause is predetermined 
(H3c).
H3a Receiving PC after a service failure leads to a more 
positive sense of distributive justice than where no compen-
sation is offered.
H3b Receiving PC after a service failure leads to a less posi-
tive evaluation of distributive justice than receiving tangible 
compensation.
H3c Receiving PC where the customer can choose the cause 
leads to a more positive sense of distributive justice than 
when the service provider has predetermined the cause.
Procedural Justice
Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the corpo-
rate recovery policies and procedures (Homburg and Fürst 
2005), and we were interested to compare the effects of 
the various compensation procedures on perceived proce-
dural justice. In the no compensation scenario, no action is 
required from the customer. In the tangible compensation 
situation, such as being offered a gift voucher, the cus-
tomer proactively receives the voucher. However, where 
PC is offered, more complex procedures (putting a card 
in a box, filling in a form) are required. These differences 
could lead to different evaluations. Research on cause-
related marketing actions has shown that there is a nega-
tive relationship between the personal costs in terms of 
effort and time and a customer’s willingness to participate 
in a campaign (Carroll and Shabana 2010). Research on 
prosocial behavior has similarly documented that personal 
costs negatively influence an individual’s intentions to opt 
for prosocial behavior (Howie et al. 2015). If the offer of 
PC similarly requires active customer participation, then 
the associated personal costs will increase. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the simpler and more transparent proce-
dures of no compensation (H4a) and the provision of a gift 
voucher (H4b) will result in higher procedural justice than 
offering prosocial compensation.
Research on cause-related marketing shows that ‘per-
sonal involvement’ affects customers’ evaluations. Having 
a choice enhances a customer’s personal role in helping the 
cause (Robinson et al. 2012) and the feeling of personal 
responsibility (Mattila and Cranage 2005). Being involved 
in the donation procedure by choosing the cause to support 
increases customers’ perceived procedural justice (Robinson 
et al. 2012). Consequently, being able to choose a specific 
cause when offered PC should lead to a more positive evalu-
ation of procedural justice than when the cause is predeter-
mined (H4c).
H4a Receiving PC after a service failure results in less pro-
cedural justice than when compensation is not offered.
H4b Receiving PC after a service failure results in less pro-
cedural justice than when tangible compensation is received.
H4c Receiving PC with a choice of good cause leads to 
a more positive sense of procedural justice than when the 
cause is predetermined.
Post‑recovery Satisfaction
Customer satisfaction in general can be defined as their 
evaluation of the post-consumption experience of products 
or services based on their overall purchase and consumption 
experiences (based on Anderson et al. 2004; Luo and Bhat-
tacharya 2006). Customer satisfaction has been regarded 
as a pivotal element in maintaining long-term customer 
relationships and increasing corporate value (e.g., Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2006). CSR efforts have been shown to have a 
positive effect on customer satisfaction (Kang and Hustvedt 
2014; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Pérez and del Bosque 
2013a). Research on the relationship between CSR and ser-
vice failures has found that CSR has a buffering role in the 
negative impact of failures on customer satisfaction (Bolton 
and Mattila 2015). Our research focuses on post-recovery 
satisfaction, which we define as a customer’s evaluation of 
a post-failure recovery situation.
When customers encounter a service failure, a crucial 
challenge is how to restore their satisfaction (Siu et al. 2013). 
Expectancy disconfirmation theory (Oliver 1993) states that 
differences between recovery expectations and experiences 
can lead to positive or negative disconfirmations, which 
subsequently influence post-recovery satisfaction. Custom-
ers have ethical expectations about the fairness and right-
ness of the recovery. In effect, people have certain stand-
ards against which they judge an organization’s corporate 
recovery actions and the way it behaves morally (Ingram 
et al. 2005; Magnini et al. 2007). The perceived justice of the 
recovery actions provokes the cognitive evaluation of post-
recovery satisfaction. Service recovery research has shown 
that receiving tangible compensation has a positive effect on 
post-recovery satisfaction (e.g., Del Rìo-Lanza et al. 2009; 
Schoefer and Ennew 2005; Thomassen et al. 2017; Wirtz 
and Mattila 2004).
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Based on the literature (e.g., Del Rìo-Lanza et al. 2009; 
Kang and Hustvedt 2014; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; 
Pérez and del Bosque 2013a), we would expect the receipt 
of PC after a service failure to have a more positive effect 
on post-recovery satisfaction than not being offered any 
compensation (H5a). In line with our earlier reasoning, we 
further hypothesize that PC will lead to less positive post-
recovery satisfaction than receiving tangible compensation 
(H5b), and that PC to a cause of the customer’s choosing 
leads to more positive post-recovery satisfaction ratings 
than when the cause is determined by the service provider 
(H5c).
H5a Receiving PC after a service failure leads to more posi-
tive post-recovery satisfaction than if no compensation is 
offered.
H5b Receiving PC after a service failure leads to lower post-
recovery satisfaction than receiving tangible compensation.
H5c Receiving PC where the cause is chosen by the cus-
tomer leads to more positive post-recovery satisfaction than 
when the cause is predetermined by the service provider.
Sector
As in Experiment 1, we tested our hypotheses within the 
public and private sectors to broaden the generalizability 
of our findings. Many public services are indirectly funded 
through taxpayers’ money, although specific products such 
as visas and driving licenses might be paid for directly by 
citizens acting as customers. In order to use comparable 
public and private service situations we simulated such 
a situation. That is, in both the public and private sector 
scenarios, there was a direct exchange situation in which 
a customer’s money is directly related to the value they 
receive (Alford 2002). Therefore, after a service failure, 
one might expect similar customer evaluations in both 
scenarios.
Method Experiment 2A
In testing our hypotheses, we first conducted a relatively 
small experiment in a research laboratory that compared the 
effects of PC with those of tangible compensation (Hypoth-
eses 3b, 3c, 4b, 4c, 5b, and 5c). Later, in Experiment 2B, we 
tested all the hypotheses.
Participants and Design
In total, 148 Dutch undergraduate students (45.8% female; 
Mage = 21.0; SD = 2.33) participated, for which they earned 
course credits. They were randomly assigned to one condi-
tion of an experiment with a 3 (compensation1: gift voucher, 
PC with a fixed cause, PC of customer’s choosing) × 2 (sec-
tor: private, public) between-subjects factorial design. Com-
puters gave all the instructions for the participants.
Procedure and Dependent Variables
Similar to Experiment 1, an internet store was used to rep-
resent a private organization. However, in order to broaden 
insights into the effects of PC in public settings, we changed 
from a governmental visa organization to a Dutch municipal-
ity and the task to issuing driving licenses. Both the public 
and private scenarios would be relevant to Dutch under-
graduate students. Participants were informed that, in the 
private scenario, they had ordered a product from the only 
internet store that sold a specific product for 40 euro. In the 
municipality scenario, participants were informed that they 
had requested a new driving license that again cost 40 euro. 
Participants then receive a message that the product/license 
is ready for collection (about a 20-min drive from home). 
In both scenarios, the customer than goes to the collection 
point and is served by an employee. They are then informed 
by the employee that the product/license is not yet available 
as it has not been delivered by the supplier, and that it will 
be available the next day. Given that we had to use different 
types of product, we wanted to ensure that this did not lead 
to a difference in the perceived severity of the service failure. 
Therefore, we asked participants to indicate the perceived 
severity of the service failure (cf. Mattila 2001).
The scenario continued with participants seeing, behind 
the employees’ desk, a large poster stating the service guar-
antee: ‘Whatever we do, we keep our promises, guaranteed!’ 
and in addition, depending on which scenario they had been 
allocated: ‘If not you’ll receive a personal gift voucher worth 
5 euro/we will donate 5 euro to a fixed cause/we will donate 
5 euro to a cause of your choosing.’ This was followed by 
an apology by the employee and the immediate offering of 
compensation. Depending on the scenario, this amounted 
to a gift voucher, placing a card in a box (PC with prede-
termined cause), or asking the customer for their chosen 
1 Experiments 2A and 2B also contained an additional double devia-
tion condition. Under this condition, people were initially promised 
compensation but following a failure (the first deviation) were not 
offered one (a second deviation). Since this article focuses on the 
effects of prosocial compensation, it is not relevant to compare the 
effects of PC with those of a double deviation condition here. How-
ever, we would like to note that the results for the double deviation 
condition were similar to previously reported effects (e.g., Casado-
Díaz and Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009; Thomassen et  al. 2017): that it 
leads to lower levels of perceived justice and post-recovery satisfac-
tion than not promising and not offering compensation.
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cause. The compensation was set at 5 euro and, as such, was 
unrelated to, nor fully compensated for, the inconvenience 
caused. This was because being overly generous following 
a service failure may lead customers to question the reasons 
behind the over-generosity of a public organization and to 
doubt the sincerity and credibility of the service guarantee 
(McQuilken et al. 2013). At the end of this interaction, par-
ticipants were thanked and asked by the employee to return 
the next day to collect the product/license. Participants were 
then asked to imagine themselves outside the building and 
reflecting on the situation.
Next, participants were asked to complete our question-
naire (for an overview of all the items: see Appendix in 
Table 4). For distributive justice, we used a three-item scale 
from Lii and Lee (2012) adapted for the specific scenario 
(α = 0.80). A sample item being, ‘The compensation for the 
inconvenience is fair.’ Scales used to measure procedural 
justice are often based on situations where customers had to 
complain and, in our scenarios, this was not the case. There-
fore, in order to fit our situation, we developed a new three-
item scale for procedural justice (α = 0.83) with a sample item 
being: ‘The organization used a good procedure to solve my 
problem.’ Given that the manner in which employees inter-
acted with customers in this recovery situation was fixed (for 
instance, they always apologized), we did not include interac-
tional justice as a dependent variable (cf. Crisafulli and Singh 
2016; Thomassen et al. 2017). For post-recovery satisfaction, 
we used a three-item scale (α = 0.83) that had been applied by 
McCollough et al. (2000), and later by Huang and Lin (2011), 
with an example question being: ‘Overall, how satisfied or 
dissatisfied did this experience make you feel?’ Further, we 
wanted to control for perceived realism and, therefore, asked 
participants to indicate the perceived realism of their scenario 
(cf. Magnini et al. 2007). Finally, we asked for the demo-
graphics of the participant (age, gender, and nationality). The 
questionnaire ended with four manipulation checks to verify 
whether participants had grasped the specific elements of their 
scenario.
Results and Discussion Experiment 2A
Manipulation Checks and Control Variables
Five of the 153 respondents were excluded from the analy-
sis for failing two or more of the manipulation checks. As 
in Experiment 1, we compared the results with and with-
out those participants who failed a single manipulation 
checks and the results again showed similar patterns and 
therefore these participants were included. This resulted 
in 148 valid cases for the subsequent analysis. A one-way 
ANOVA with Sector as the only independent variable (as 
Compensation type was only manipulated after this ques-
tion had been answered) on the severity of the service fail-
ure indicated that there was no significant Sector effect: 
F(1,141) = 0.001, p = 0.974 (Minternet store = 5.71; SD = 1.42; 
Mmunicipality = 5.70; SD = 1.43). A full factorial ANOVA on 
perceived realism similarly failed to find a significant Sec-
tor effect: F(1,142) = 1.80, p = 0.182 (Minternet store = 4.32; 
SD = 1.68; Mmunicipality = 4.11; SD = 1.84), and no sig-
nificant Compensation effect: F(2,142) = 2.78, p = 0.065 
(Mgift voucher = 4.60; SD = 1.77; Mfixed cause = 4.15; SD = 1.70; 
Mcustomer’s chosen cause = 3.92; SD = 1.75). There was also no 
significant interaction effect. As such, we can rule out per-
ceived severity and perceived realism as alternative drivers 
of Sector or Compensation effects.
Main Dependent Variables
A MANOVA with the three dependent variables yielded 
a significant main effect of Compensation: Λ = 0.81, F(6, 
280) = 5.25, p = 0.000. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the 
outcome variables revealed significant Compensation effects 
on distributive justice (F(2,142) = 13.10, p = 0.000), proce-
dural justice (F(2,142) = 9.41, p = 0.000), and post-recovery 
satisfaction (F(2,142) = 3.09, p = 0.049). As in Experiment 
1, in order to test the hypotheses, we employed specific 
post hoc Bonferroni analyses using pairwise comparisons 
of the dependent variables. The main results are presented 
in Table 2, and the means and standard deviations for all 
Table 2  Means (SDs in 
parentheses) for the dependent 
variables by compensation type 
(Experiment 2A)
Means sharing the same superscript (a or b) within a row are not significantly different from each other 
(Bonferroni, p < 0.05)
Gift voucher (GV) Fixed cause (FC) Customer’s 
chosen cause 
(CCC)
N 48 48 52
Distributive justice 4.31a (1.28) 3.08b (1.32) 3.40b (1.28)
Procedural justice 5.14a (1.44) 3.91b (1.42) 4.43b (1.54)
Post-recovery satisfaction 3.25a (1.39) 2.60b (1.18) 2.96ab (1.28)
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the compensation types by sector are included Appendix 
in Table 6.
In terms of distributive justice, tangible compensa-
tion, here a gift voucher, (M = 4.31, SD = 1.28) led to a 
significantly higher perception of distributive justice than 
both types of PC (MFC = 3.08, SDFC = 1.32; MCCC  = 3.40, 
SDCCC  = 1.28); (GV–FC: p = 0.000; GV–CCC: p = 0.000). 
There was no significant difference in distributive justice 
between the two forms of PC, (CCC-FC: p = 1.000). Again 
with procedural justice, tangible compensation (M = 5.14, 
SD = 1.44) led to a significantly higher perception of proce-
dural justice than both types of PC (MFC = 3.91, SDFC = 1.42; 
MCCC  = 4.43, SDCCC  = 1.54); (GV–FC: p = 0.000; GV–CCC: 
p = 0.015). and there was no significant difference between 
the two forms of PC (CCC-FC: p = 0.461). Finally, for post-
recovery satisfaction, tangible compensation (M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.39) once again led to significantly higher post-
recovery satisfaction than PC with a fixed cause (MFC = 2.60, 
SDFC = 1.18); GV–FC: p = 0.043; but PC with a customer’s 
chosen cause was similarly effective as tangible compen-
sation in creating post-recovery satisfaction (MCCC  = 2.96, 
SDCCC  = 1.28); GV–CCC: p = 0.439. However, PC with a 
choice of cause led to similar post-recovery satisfaction as 
that with a fixed cause (CCC-FC: p = 0.929). As in Experi-
ment 1, the MANOVA failed to identify any significant Sec-
tor effects (A = 0.98, F(3, 140) = 1.11, p = .346) or interac-
tion effects between Compensation and Sector (Λ = 0.98, 
F(6, 280) = 0.44, p = 0.851). All the Means and Standard 
Deviations for each compensation type—sector combination 
are included Appendix in Table 6.
To summarize, the results of Experiment 2A, indicate that 
both types of PC lead to significantly lower distributive (H3b) 
and procedural justice (H4b) than tangible compensation. This 
is also true for post-recovery satisfaction when comparing 
tangible compensation and PC with a fixed cause. However, 
PC with the customer choosing the cause led to similar post-
recovery satisfaction as offering a gift voucher (H5b). Further, 
there were no significant differences in the evaluations of the 
two types of PC (H3c, H4c, and H5c). There were also no 
significant differences between the two sectors.
Method Experiment 2B
Experiment 2A showed that, generally, tangible compensa-
tion results in higher perceived justice and satisfaction than 
PC. The one exception being that PC where the customer 
chooses the cause scores equally well for post-recovery sat-
isfaction. In Experiment 2B, we added a control condition in 
which no promise of compensation was made, and no com-
pensation given. This was in order to test whether PC had 
positive effects compared with not offering compensation 
(Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 5a). In this experiment, we expected 
that although tangible compensation would still yield higher 
perceptions of justice and satisfaction than PC (as found in 
Experiment 2A), that PC would have a compensatory func-
tion and, thus, would work better after a service failure than 
no compensation at all.
Further, in Experiment 2A, we had used a rather small sam-
ple of Dutch students. In order to increase the power of our 
data, we used a larger sample, this time mainly US citizens, in 
Experiment 2B. In Experiment 2A, we had found that Sector 
did not influence the perceived severity of the service failure, 
suggesting there were no concerns regarding the manipulation 
we had applied. However, we had asked the control question to 
test this prior to introducing the Compensation manipulation, 
and we were concerned that this could have influenced subse-
quent interpretation of the scenarios. Therefore, in Experiment 
2B we asked this control question after the introduction of 
both manipulations. We expected to find no effect of Sector 
on perceived severity (cf. Experiment 2A), which would again 
suggest that the product type did not confound with setting. 
However, one could expect that people find a service failure 
especially important when perceived procedural and distribu-
tive justice is low, i.e., when there is no compensation.
Participants
In total, 633 people participated in this experiment, of which 
596 people (43% female; Mage = 36.6; SD = 11.36) satisfied 
the control criteria and were included in the analyses (see 
Results section). Of these, 98.2% lived in the United States, 
1.6% in Canada, and 0.2% in other countries. They partici-
pated through a digital web-based questionnaire (Qualtrics) 
using the online MTurk platform.
Design, Procedure, and Dependent Variables
Experiment 2B was identical to Experiment 2A apart from 
three aspects. First, although participants still read that the 
product was not there yet, received an apology, and were asked 
to return the next day, no reference was made to any service 
guarantee or compensation. Second, since the distribution of 
driving licenses is organized differently in the US to the Neth-
erlands, we could not use the issuance of driving licenses as 
our public sector scenario. Therefore, similar to Experiment 
1, we used a governmental visa organization for the public 
setting. Third, and again similar to Experiment 1, we applied 
three manipulation checks and included one instructional 
manipulation check question (cf. Oppenheimer et al. 2009). 
However, this time, the questions on the perceived severity and 
perceived realism of our control variables were asked after the 
manipulation of the independent variables. The same depend-
ent variables were used in this third experiment as in Experi-
ment 2A: distributive justice (α = 0.90), procedural justice 
(α = 0.84) and post-recovery satisfaction (α = 0.96).
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Results and Discussion Experiment 2B
Manipulation Checks and Control Variables
We used the same criteria for exclusion of participants as in 
Experiment 1 with an MTurk panel. This resulted in excluding 
37 of the 633 respondents, leading to 596 usable cases. The 
ANOVA on the perceived realism of the scenarios indicated that 
only Compensation had a significant effect: F(3,588) = 52.87, 
p = 0.000 (MNC = 5.97; SD = 1.16; MGV = 5.24; SD = 1.81; 
MCCC  = 4.29; SD = 1.57; MFC = 3.81; SD = 1.80). As in Experi-
ment 1, we used regression analyses, including Realism and the 
four dummy variables that indicated the Sector and Compensa-
tion condition (with No compensation forming the reference 
group), and excluding a constant in the equation to rule out 
Realism as an alternative driver of the Compensation effects 
on the dependent variables. Our results showed that Realism 
significantly predicted procedural justice (p = 0.000) and post-
recovery satisfaction (p = 0.000), and was a marginally signifi-
cant predictor of distributive justice (p = 0.059). More impor-
tantly, the effects of all the dummy variables on all three DVs 
remained significant (p’s = 0.000), indicating that realism was 
only partially driving the Compensation effects. Therefore, we 
continued testing our hypotheses using ANOVAs.
A full factorial ANOVA on the perceived sever-
ity of the service failure found no main Sector effect, 
F(3,588) = 2.26, p = 0.133, nor a significant interaction 
effect, F(3,588) = 0.30, p = 0.825. This suggests that the 
difference in products did not influence the perceived 
severity of the service failure. Thus, there was no con-
founding effect due to our sector manipulation. We did 
find that Compensation had a significant main effect, 
F(3,588) = 3.70, p = 0.012, indicating that participants 
perceived the service failure as more important when 
there was no compensation (MNC = 5.53, SD = 1.25) 
compared to when there was some form of compensa-
tion (MGV = 5.10, SD = 1.33; MCCC  = 5.16, SD = 1.39; 
MFC = 5.08, SD = 1.38). This broad finding is in line with 
the findings on justice and satisfaction as outlined below.
Main Dependent Variables
A MANOVA including the three dependent variables indi-
cated that Compensation had a significant main effect, 
Λ = 0.79, F(6, 1426.32) = 16.09, p = 0.000. Separate uni-
variate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed 
significant Compensation effects on distributive jus-
tice (F(3,588) = 38.02, p = 0.000), on procedural justice 
(F(3,588) = 46.62, p = 0.000), and on post-recovery satisfac-
tion (F(3,588) = 36.71, p = 0.000)-see Appendix in Table 5. 
Comparing the results of the private and public settings 
shows that there was virtually no Sector effect, Λ = 1.00, F(3, 
586) = 0.79, p = 0.506, nor interaction effect involving Sec-
tor, Λ = 0.98, F(9, 1426.32) = 1.10, p = .360. The one excep-
tion was that we found a marginally significant interaction 
effect in the procedural justice ANOVA, F(3,588) = 2.54, 
p = 0.056. We will discuss this further when we present the 
specific findings on procedural justice.
When it came to distributive justice, PC with both fixed 
(MFC = 3.25, SDFC = 1.50) and customer’s chosen causes 
(MCCC  = 3.47, SDCCC  = 1.62) led to significantly higher dis-
tributive justice than not offering compensation (MNC = 2.13, 
SDNC = 1.17); (FC–NC: p = 0.000; CCC–NC: p = 0.000) (see 
Table 3). Tangible compensation (MGV = 3.88, SDGV = 1.57) 
led to significantly higher positive distributive justice than 
fixed cause PC (GV–FC: p = 0.001) but to similar distribu-
tive justice as PC with a cause of the customer’s choosing; 
(GV–CCC: p = 0.070). Both forms of PC led to similar per-
ceptions of distributive justice (FC–CCC: p = 0.582).
Similarly, with procedural justice, PC with both a 
fixed cause (MFC = 3.91, SDFC = 1.55) and with a cus-
tomer’s chosen cause (MCCC  = 4.17, SDCCC  = 1.37) led to 
significantly higher distributive justice than no compen-
sation (MNC = 2.85, SDNC = 1.36); (FC–NC: p = 0.000; 
CCC–NC: p = 0.000). Tangible compensation (MGV = 4.75, 
SDGV = 1.41) led to significantly higher procedural justice 
than both forms of PC: (GV–FC: p = 0.000; GV–CCC: 
p = 0.002). The level of perceived procedural justice was 
similar for both types of PC (FC–CCC: p = .317). As noted 
previously, there was a marginally significant interaction 
effect: F(3,588) = 2.54, p = 0.056. In the private-sector 
Table 3  Means (SDs in 
parentheses) for the dependent 
variables by compensation type 
(Experiment 2B)
Means with the same superscript (a or b) within a row are not significantly different from each other (Bon-





Fixed cause (FC) Customer’s chosen 
cause (CCC)
N 144 153 151 148
Distributive justice 2.13a (1.17) 3.88b (1.57) 3.25c (1.50) 3.47bc (1.62)
Procedural justice 2.85a (1.36) 4.75b (1.41) 3.91c (1.55) 4.17c (1.37)
Post-recovery satisfac-
tion
1.77a (1.01) 3.54b (1.66) 2.85c (1.61) 3.02c (1.56)
138 J.-P. Thomassen et al.
1 3
setting, the four Compensation conditions all significantly 
differed from each other (p’s < 0.001). The only instance 
of a non-significant difference was between the two forms 
of PC: p = 0.097 (MNC = 2.75, SDNC = 1.35; MFC = 3.65, 
SDFC = 1.64; MCCC  = 4.03, SDCCC  = 1.38; MGV = 4.93, 
SDGV = 1.33). Within the public setting, offering PC with a 
fixed cause (MFC = 4.17, SDFC = 1.42) led to higher proce-
dural justice than not offering compensation (MNC = 2.95, 
SDNC = 1.36), p = 0.000. However, there was no signifi-
cant difference in terms of the resulting procedural jus-
tice between offering the two forms of PC (MCCC  = 4.32, 
SDCCC  = 1.35), p = 0.514. Further, there was no significant 
difference between the effects of PC to a customer’s chosen 
cause and a gift voucher (MGV = 4.59, SDGV = 1.47).
Finally, for post-recovery satisfaction, both forms of PC 
(MFC = 2.85, SDFC = 1.61; MCCC  = 3.02, SDCCC  = 1.56) led to 
significantly higher post-recovery satisfaction than no com-
pensation (MNC = 1.77, SDNC = 1.01); (FC–NC: p = 0.000; 
CCC–NC: p = 0.000). Post-recovery satisfaction was sig-
nificantly higher when tangible compensation (MGV = 3.54, 
SDGV = 1.66) was offered than with either form of PC; 
(GV–FC: p = 0.001; GV–CCC: p = 0.016). Finally, both 
forms of PC led to similar levels of post-recovery satisfac-
tion; (FC–CCC: p = 1.000).
To summarize, Experiment 2B showed that both types of 
PC led to higher perceived distributive justice, procedural 
justice, and post-recovery satisfaction than not offering 
compensation after a service failure (supporting H3a, H4a, 
and H5a). Nevertheless, as with Experiment 2A, our results 
showed that a gift voucher was even more effective in boost-
ing procedural justice and post-recovery satisfaction than 
either type of PC (H4b and H5b). Although fixed-cause PC 
was not as effective as tangible compensation, in the form of 
a gift voucher, in increasing distributive justice, PC to a cause 
of the customer’s choosing was as effective (H3b). Further, 
there were no significant differences in the evaluations of the 
two types of PC (H3c, H4c, and H5c). Finally, there were also 
no main or interaction effects involving the Sector.
General Discussion
Organizations are continuously seeking new CSR practices 
that can contribute to their CSR engagement and positively 
influence the perceptions and behaviors of their customers. 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether PC could con-
tribute to CSR signaling and justice effects and so contribute 
to fulfilling corporate ethical and philanthropic responsibili-
ties (the third and fourth dimension of Caroll’s pyramid). Our 
first experiment showed that communicating and explicitly 
promising PC in the event of a service failure improves CSR 
image, corporate image, credibility, and WOM-intent among 
customers. Experiments 2A and 2B further show that offering 
PC after a service failure leads to higher levels of distribu-
tive justice, procedural justice, and post-recovery satisfaction. 
Overall, PC leads to improved customer evaluations and, at the 
same time, contributes to meeting corporate ethical and philan-
thropic responsibilities. Our study shows that both companies 
and public organizations can benefit from adding PC to their 
corporate philanthropy practices.
The conventional corporate practice when using service 
guarantees is to offer customers some form of tangible com-
pensation after a service failure such as a refund, gift vouch-
ers, or discounts on future purchases. In line with this, the 
marketing and services management literature on service 
guarantees has similarly focused on such tangible types of 
compensation (see Hogreve and Gremler 2009). So why do 
we suggest companies should switch from these tangible types 
of compensation to offering prosocial compensation? Our 
research shows that communicating to potential customers 
the offering of PC leads to similar positive levels of corporate 
image, credibility, and WOM-intent as offering a gift voucher. 
Further, in service recovery situations, PC has positive effects 
on perceived justice and post-recovery satisfaction, although 
admittedly to a lesser extent than a gift voucher. Nevertheless, 
we argue that PC could have an advantage because it has a 
strong positive signaling effect on CSR image, which tangible 
compensation lacks. By enhancing CSR image, we argue that 
PC will benefit the organization at large.
This study contributes to the CSR and business ethics 
literature by introducing a new CSR practice. This practice 
does not only reflect the responsibility of the organizations in 
serving society, but also the responsibility of the customers to 
act in a societal beneficial way (Consumer Social Responsi-
bility–Vitell 2015). It further contributes to signaling theory 
by showing that, as with other corporate philanthropy prac-
tices, PC has the power to influence potential customers’ per-
ceptions of the organization. This study is one of the few to 
have researched CSR in service operation situations (Bolton 
and Mattila 2015) and is the first to combine the concepts 
of CSR and business ethics with service guarantees (for an 
overview of the service guarantee literature, see Hogreve 
and Gremler 2009). Service guarantees have the potential to 
enhance corporate ethical responsibilities by increasing the 
transparency to customers about what they can expect from 
the company. Our study also contributes to justice theory by 
showing that a psychological form of compensation is able to 
restore perceived justice and boost post-recovery satisfaction. 
Finally, apart from Thomassen et al. (2017), this research is 
unique in using signaling theory and justice theory in a public 
sector setting. It shows that these theories are as applicable in 
public settings as they are in private settings.
Overall, reflecting on the findings from the three experi-
ments, two aspects turned out differently than we had 
expected. First, earlier research on customers’ evaluations 
had shown that choice improves value and equity (Mattila 
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and Cranage 2005) and has a positive impact on customers’ 
evaluations of an organization as being more ethical, cred-
ible, and socially responsible (Howie et al. 2015). Further, 
research on the effects of cause-related marketing shows 
that a donation to a cause of the customer’s choice leads to 
improved evaluations compared with a fixed cause deter-
mined by the supplier (Grau and Folse 2007; Howie et al. 
2015; Robinson et al. 2012). Based on these results, we had 
expected that prosocial compensation in which the customer 
was allowed to choose the cause would lead to significantly 
more positive signaling and justice effects than a fixed cause 
predetermined by the supplier. However, apart from some 
minor exceptions, our results did not bear this out. A pos-
sible explanation is that being given a choice increases a 
customer’s ‘personal costs’ in terms of effort and time (Rob-
inson et al. 2012). Customers tend to choose the option with 
the lowest personal cost in terms of effort and time (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008). Therefore choice does not always lead to 
more positive customer evaluations (e.g., Botti and McGill 
2011; Thaler 1980). For example, research on cause-related 
marketing campaigns (Robinson et al. 2012) found a nega-
tive relationship between these personal costs and willing-
ness to participate in an action. In our Experiments 2A and 
2B, the personal costs of fixed-cause PC was low whereas, 
when there was a free choice, customers had to think about 
their favorite cause. This could have influenced the results.
The second somewhat surprising outcome relates to the 
differences in outcomes between the public and private 
sectors. Earlier research suggests that the effects of CSR 
practices on customers’ evaluations are moderated by the 
sector (Pérez and del Bosque 2015; Strahilevitz and Myers 
1998). Several factors might influence the signaling effects 
of PC, possibly leading to different effects in public and 
private settings. For example, the image of an organization 
could lead to different PC signaling effects since non-profit 
organizations are perceived as warmer but less professional 
than for-profit organizations (Aaker et al. 2010). However, 
in our findings, there were only minor differences in the 
signaling and justice effects between our public and private 
sector settings. One reason for this might be that we, in order 
to use scenarios that were as similar as possible, used direct 
exchange situations in all three experiments. That is, in both 
private and public settings, customers had to pay directly for 
the product. In such situations, the customers’ money can 
be directly related to the value they receive (Alford 2002). 
Future research in public settings could investigate the 
effects of PC in settings where customers do not pay directly 
for a service. Another reason for the similar results could 
be that, like corporate services, public services also have to 
satisfy customers’ needs (Vigoda 2002). Further, customers’ 
experiences in corporate settings have been shown to influ-
ence their public service expectations (Clarke et al. 2007). 
The increasing commercialization of public services, and the 
introduction of many corporate management and customer 
service innovations, may have shifted customers’ expecta-
tions of public service delivery to levels similar to those 
found in the private sector (Clarke et al. 2007; Needham 
2006). Taken together, these findings on the public versus 
private settings suggest it is relevant to study the discrete 
effects in different situations in future research.
Managerial Recommendations
CSR-engaged organizations could use PC in the case of ser-
vice failures instead of offering no compensation or a tan-
gible compensation like money back, a gift voucher or free 
products/services. In order to work effectively, they should 
explicitly communicate PC as an element of a service guar-
antee. Moreover, it is crucial to actually offer PC in the case a 
service failure is made. If organizations do not live up to their 
promise, it will create a backlash and customers will dislike 
the organization more than when there was no promise made 
(cf. Thomassen et al. 2017). Finally, in the current study we 
focused on situations in which there was a low level of ser-
vice failure severity: customers did not get into big problems 
due to the service failure. When service failure severity goes 
up, one might expect that only receiving PC would not be 
sufficient to compensate for the problems the customers expe-
rienced. Future research should study the impact of service 
failure severity in more detail. The current study, however, 
indicates that PC can work well for such small service fail-
ures. When CSR-engaged organizations use these guidelines, 
they could use PC as a practice to contribute to their ethical 
responsibilities by fulfilling customer rights and to their phil-
anthropic responsibilities by donating to charitable causes.
Limitations and Future Research
We attempted to establish service settings with similar failures 
and similar service recovery situations in order to compare 
private and public sectors. Experiments 2A and 2B showed 
that failure severity was perceived as similar in both private 
and public settings. However, the perceived realism of the 
scenarios in terms of Sector (Experiment 1) and type of Com-
pensation (Experiments 1 and 2B) were not equivalent. The 
differences in perceived realism could be caused by the fact 
that compensating for service failures is not yet an everyday 
practice in public settings. Differences in the perceived real-
ism of the compensation offered could be due to prosocial 
compensation being a relatively novel practice. This can only 
be tested when PC becomes a more common form of redress 
in both private and public organizations. Note, however, that 
our analysis indicated that realism (or a lack thereof) was not 
sufficient to explain our findings. That is, compensation and 
sector had significant effects, with the same pattern of effects, 
when realism was treated as a covariate.
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We used a vignette approach in order to achieve sufficient 
sample sizes and gather reliable data to measure the effects on 
customers’ evaluations. Vignette studies have been used in sim-
ilar service recovery situations (Ohtsubo and Watanabe 2009; 
Thomassen et al. 2017) and in situations that are emotional 
for customers (Barkworth and Murphy 2015; Van Doorn et al. 
2012). Despite their realism and high internal validity, vignettes 
remain hypothetical and capture stated rather than revealed 
preferences. Again, it was impossible to gather data on actual 
service failures, and the effects that PC has on these, simply 
because offering PC is not yet a common practice in either com-
panies or public organizations. Nevertheless, we hope this paper 
will encourage the use of PC and that, in the near future, it will 
be possible to research the emotional and cognitive effects of 
PC on genuine customers after service failures.
We view this research on the effects of PC as the starting 
point for more research on PC. In addition to the above avenue 
for future research, we have identified five other relevant ave-
nues that could enhance understanding of customer’s attitudes 
towards PC and generate insights into how to design effective 
PC practices. The second avenue relates to possible moderating 
effects on PC outcomes of the types and personality traits of 
customers. Several studies (e.g., Bolton and Mattila 2015; Rob-
inson et al. 2012) have shown that these significantly affect the 
outcomes of CSR practices. For example, the effects of choice 
in cause-related marketing campaigns depend on the collectiv-
ism (high versus low) of customers (Robinson et al. 2012).
A third avenue could usefully address the effects of different 
types of PC. In our research, we investigated the effects of PC 
with either a fixed predetermined cause or where the customer 
has a completely free choice of recipient. The effects of offer-
ing choice within a predetermined list of causes, which would 
reduce a customer’s personal costs, could be investigated. In 
addition, the effects of customers being able to choose between 
prosocial and tangible compensation, situations in which the 
company matches a customer’s own donations (Karlan and 
List 2007; Karlan et al. 2011), and situations in which cus-
tomers can choose between PC in the form of a donation or of 
employee volunteering (Plewa et al. 2015) could be studied. 
In a similar vein, the effects of different levels of PC could 
be studied. While we offered token amounts for the time and 
money customers had lost due to service failure, the service 
recovery literature (Gelbrich et al. 2015; McQuilken et al. 
2013) and the CSR literature (Folse et al. 2010) show that 
different compensation and donation amounts can have differ-
ent effects on customers’ evaluations. In other words, studying 
both the type of PC and the amount of PC could foster a better 
understanding of the scope of the PC effect.
A fourth avenue could address the effects that cause fit 
and a customer’s perception of the corporate motivation in 
offering PC have. Cause fit refers to the match between “the 
company, its products, branding, positioning, and target 
audience, on one hand, and the needs of its CSR initiatives 
and groups involved in them, on the other hand” (Pérez and 
del Bosque 2013b, p. 158). As with cause-related marketing 
campaigns, the effectiveness of offering PC could depend 
on how the customer perceives the fit between the chari-
table cause and the company (Robinson et al. 2012). The 
effects of CSR practices, such as PC, in part depend on how 
such altruistic corporate actions are perceived by customers 
(Brown and Dacin 1997; Howie et al. 2015). As with other 
types of corporate philanthropy (Kang and Hustvedt 2014; 
Liket and Simaens 2015), the perceived motives for donat-
ing to charitable causes could change the effects that PC 
has. A poor fit and a negatively perceived corporate motiva-
tion, such as to gain tax advantages, could lead to skepticism 
among customers (Folse et al. 2010). These aspects were not 
addressed in our experiments, and follow-up research could 
investigate their influence on customers’ evaluations.
The next avenue concerns the effects of employee behavior 
when offering PC to customers in service recovery situations. 
In line with Crisafully and Singh (2016), we kept the interaction 
with the employee (interactional justice) intentionally constant 
in Experiments 2A and 2B in order to focus on the effects of 
compensation and the payout process. However, in daily prac-
tice, there will be differences in employee behavior in service 
recovery situations and this could influence the levels of per-
ceived justice (e.g., Homburg and Fürst 2005) and of customer 
satisfaction. Björlin Lidén and Skålén (2003, p. 52) described 
a hotel setting where employees focused on offering tangible 
compensation, rather than displaying empathic and respon-
sive behavior, to guests after a service failure. This resulted in 
decreased levels of guest satisfaction. Research in PC settings 
could similarly investigate the effects on customers’ evaluations 
of differences in employee behavior when resolving problems 
and offering PC. Moreover, studying the role of employees in 
PC could further our understanding of CSR as it would take a 
broader perspective than the traditional focus on customers as 
key drivers of CSR initiatives (cf. Wang et al. 2016).
Finally, future research could focus on organizational ena-
blers, i.e., the boundary conditions for strategically imple-
menting service guarantees and PC in an organization, and 
making this part of everyday practice. For example, com-
panies with better outside-in corporate abilities may find 
it easier to implement and use the concept than internally 
oriented companies without a customer focus. Follow-up 
research could determine the enablers, their importance, and 
possible clustering in order to support the implementation 
of PC (see also Thomassen et al. 2014).
Conclusions
Organizations could use PC in order to contribute to their 
ethical and philanthropic CSR responsibilities. Proso-
cial compensation offers value and equity to customers 
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experiencing a service failure by offering them psycho-
logical compensation and, at the same time, enhances the 
organization’s CSR image. By showing the benefits of the 
corporate philanthropic practice of offering PC, we have 
broadened the range of options that companies and public 
organizations can use to satisfy customers and fulfill their 
CSR obligations.
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Table 4  Scales and items used in the three experiments
Dependent variable Used in exp’mt Items
CSR image 1 (a) This internet store/governmental visa organization is a socially responsible organization
(b) This internet store/governmental visa organization is concerned about the wellbeing of society
(c) I think this internet store/governmental visa organization has legitimate interest in improving society
(d) Contributing to society appears important to this internet store/governmental visa organization 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) The scales are presented separately for each sector
Corporate image 1 (a) Negative–positive
(b) Unfavorable–favorable
(c) Bad–Good
(d) Dislike–Like (7 point scale)
Credibility 1 (a) I have sincere doubts about the ability of the internet store/governmental visa organization to keep its 
promises (R)
(b) There would be no risk in dealing with this internet store/governmental visa organization
(c) I would feel very confident in dealing with this internet store/governmental visa organization
(d) I am confident in the ability of this internet store/governmental visa organization to perform as prom-
ised (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The scales are presented separately for each sector
WOM-intent 1 (a) I would say positive things about this internet store/governmental visa organization to other people
(b) If someone talks negatively about this internet store/governmental visa organization I would argue 
against them (1 = most unlikely, 7 = most likely). The scales are presented separately for each sector
Severity of service failure 2A & 2B (a) How would you rate the importance of the service failure? (1 = unimportant, 7 = extremely important)
Distributive justice 2A & 2B (a) The compensation for the inconvenience is fair
(b) I did not receive what I deserve (R)
(c) The outcome I received was not fair (R) (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Procedural justice 2A & 2B (a) The organization used a good procedure to solve my problem
(b) If I was an employee of that organization, I would have acted similarly
(c) I felt taken seriously (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Post-recovery satisfaction 2A & 2B (a) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied did this experience make you feel? (1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = very 
satisfied)
(b) How well did this service experience meet your needs? (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely yes)
(c) Overall, I am very satisfied with this experience (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Realism of the scenario 1, 2A & 2B (a) To what extent do you think this was a realistic situation? (1 = not at all realistic, 7 = very realistic)
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Table 5  Main and interaction 
effects of three experiments
Values in bold are significant (p < 0.05)
Experiment 1: signaling effects—US citizens
Dependent variable Main/interaction effect
CSR image
   Compensation F(3,595) = 15.13, p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,595) = 6.21, p = 0.013
   Compensation × sector F(3,595) = 0.84, p = 0.474
Corporate image
   Compensation F(3,595) = 4.78, p = 0.003
   Sector F(1,595) = 0.83, p = 0.363
   Compensation × sector F(3,595) = 0.82, p = 0.484
Credibility
   Compensation F(3,595) = 6.28, p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,595) = 0.04, p = 0.843
   Compensation × sector F(3,595) = 1.86, p = 0.136
WOM-intent
   Compensation F(3,595) = 7.06, p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,595) = 2.80, p = 0.095
   Compensation × sector F(3,595) = 0.03, p = 0.991
Justice effects: experiment 2A—Dutch students & Experiment 2B—mainly US citizens
Dependent variable Main/interaction effect
Experiment 2A Experiment 2B
Distributive justice
   Compensation F(2,142) = 13.10, p = 0.000 F(3,588) = 38.02, p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,142) = 2.57, p = 0.111 F(1,588) = 3.79, p = 0.187
   Compensation × sector F(2,142) = 0.82, p = 0.445 F(3,588) = 1.53,  p = 0.205
Procedural justice
   Compensation F(2,142) = 9.41, p= 0.000 F(3,588) = 46.62,  p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,142) = 1.48, p = 0.226 F(1,588) = 2.06, p = 0.152
   Compensation × sector F(2,142) = 0.85, p = 0.431 F(3,588) = 2.54, p = 0.056
Post-recovery satisfaction
   Compensation F(2,142) = 3.09,  p = 0.049 F(3,588) = 36.71,  p = 0.000
   Sector F(1,142) = 0.29, p = 0.591 F(1,588) = 1.24, p = 0.266
   Compensation × sector F(2,142) = 0.86, p= 0.425 F(3,588) = 0.73,  p = 0.534
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Table 6  Summary of means and standard deviations for the dependent variables




Total (N = 603) Internet store (N = 293) Travel visa (N = 310)
M SD M SD M SD
CSR 
image
No compensation (NC) 4.62 1.14 4.41 1.14 4.86 1.11
Gift voucher (GV) 4.95 1.13 4.82 1.03 5.05 1.20
Fixed cause (FC) 5.37 1.11 5.25 1.15 5.47 1.08
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
5.40 1.20 5.38 1.10 5.41 1.30
Corporate 
image
No compensation (NC) 5.41 1.06 5.28 0.96 5.56 1.15
Gift voucher (GV) 5.76 0.90 5.82 0.80 5.72 0.97
Fixed cause (FC) 5.73 1.09 5.71 1.24 5.75 0.96
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
5.86 1.14 5.81 1.03 5.91 1.26
Credibility No compensation (NC) 4.52 0.95 4.42 0.81 4.63 1.09
Gift voucher (GV) 4.93 0.99 5.09 0.83 4.80 1.09
Fixed cause (FC) 4.99 1.11 4.91 1.15 5.06 1.09
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
4.96 1.18 5.02 1.12 4.89 1.26
WOM-
intent
No compensation (NC) 4.09 1.26 3.99 1.16 4.21 1.36
Gift voucher (GV) 4.67 1.24 4.56 1.18 4.75 1.28
Fixed cause (FC) 4.67 1.35 4.61 1.37 4.73 1.33
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
4.71 1.41 4.61 1.41 4.81 1.42




Total (N = 148) Internet store (N = 76) Municipality (N = 72)




Gift voucher (GV) 4.31 1.28 4.63 1.27 4.16 1.28
Fixed cause (FC) 3.08 1.32 3.07 1.21 3.10 1.45
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
3.40 1.28 3.61 1.07 2.99 1.58
Procedural 
justice
Gift voucher (GV) 5.14 1.44 5.54 1.20 4.94 1.53
Fixed cause (FC) 3.91 1.42 3.84 1.23 3.99 1.63
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)





Gift voucher (GV) 3.25 1.39 3.38 1.45 3.19 1.37
Fixed cause (FC) 2.60 1.18 2.48 0.86 2.74 1.46
Customer’s chosen cause 
(CCC)
2.96 1.28 3.10 1.19 2.67 1.44
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